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The Effects of Auditor Tenure on Fraud and Its Detection 
 
ABSTRACT:  We examine the strategic effects of auditor tenure on the auditor’s testing 
strategy and the manager’s inclination to commit fraud.  Most empirical studies conclude that 
longer tenure improves audit quality.  Proponents of restricting tenure argue that longer tenure 
impairs auditor independence and a "fresh look" from a new auditor results in higher audit 
quality.  Validating this argument requires testing whether the observed difference in audit 
quality between a continuing auditor and a change in auditors is less than the theoretically 
expected difference in audit quality without impairment.  Our findings provide the guidance 
necessary for developing such tests.  Our results show that audit risk (the probability that fraud 
exists and goes undetected) is lower in both periods for the continuing auditor than with a change 
in auditors.  More importantly, we show that across both periods, expected undetected fraud is 
lower for the continuing auditor than with a change in auditors. 
 
Keywords: auditor tenure; strategic auditing;  fraud. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Security market regulators have long debated the potential effects of firms hiring the 
same auditor over multiple periods.  On one hand, some believe that as the length of time an 
auditor stays with a firm increases, the auditor becomes "too cozy" with the company.  The 
concern is that this familiarity may reduce the auditor’s skepticism about potential misstatements 
and, in turn, reduce the auditor’s effectiveness in detecting misstatements.  On the other hand, 
some argue that auditing a firm over multiple periods increases the auditor’s knowledge of the 
company’s operations and system processes, thereby increasing his effectiveness in detecting 
misstatements.  Notable frauds, such as Equity Funding, Comptronix, and Crazy Eddie that have 
occurred over several years, seem to support the first conjecture.   
Interpreting these observable outcomes might be misleading without first considering the 
underlying economics of how multi-period audits affect the auditor’s choice of effort and its 
related impact on deterring and detecting fraud.  The observation of an audit failure provides 
limited evidence regarding the (often unobservable) action choices of the auditor and manager 
that together determine the risk of undetected misstatements.  The purpose of this paper, 
therefore, is to examine the strategic effects of multi-period audits, where the accumulation of 
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audit evidence over time affects the auditor’s testing strategy and the manager’s inclination to 
commit fraud.   
Proponents of restricting auditor tenure suggest that a "fresh look" at a company by an 
auditor would result in higher quality audits.  The concern expressed in PCAOB CONCEPT 
RELEASE (PCR) No. 2011-006: Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation is that over 
time, the auditor can lose his ability to exercise professional skepticism despite adherence to the 
rules of independence.  For regulators, practitioners, or accounting researchers to assess whether 
externalities exist that could potentially be attributable to an impairment in independence, the 
first step would be to assess the equilibrium strategies of a continuing auditor versus a change in 
auditors strictly from the players maximizing their expected payoffs, where none of the payoffs 
violate the independence rules.  Our model provides such a baseline. 
Defond and Zhang (2014) point out that most studies conclude that longer auditor tenure 
improves audit quality.  Examples of such evidence include findings that longer auditor tenure is 
associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals (Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002; 
Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003), higher earnings response coefficients (Ghosh and Moon 2005), 
and more issuances of going concern opinions (Louwers 1998; Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007).  
More directly, Cameran, Francis, Marra, and Pettinicchio (2015) document that earnings quality 
improves with longer auditor tenure in Italy, where auditor rotation has been mandated since 
1975.  Further, Reid and Carcello (2017) document that the market perceives audit quality to be 
higher with longer auditor tenure.   
The challenge in interpreting these findings as evidence that longer auditor tenure does 
not impair independence is that these studies are not able to calibrate the extent that audit quality 
would be expected to be higher with a continuing auditor, had there not been any impairment of 
independence.   If there is indeed an impairment of independence, as is the concern expressed by 
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the PCAOB and others, empirical researchers would be able to document such impairments only 
by testing whether the observed difference in audit quality between a continuing auditor and a 
change in auditor is less than the theoretically expected difference in audit quality without 
impairment.  The equilibrium results of our model provide the guidance necessary for developing 
such tests. 
Our study investigates a two-period audit across two settings.  In the first setting, we have  
a change in auditors from the first period to the second period.  In the second setting, one auditor 
continues auditing from one period to the next.  In both settings, the auditor chooses audit effort 
while the manager chooses an amount of fraud, given he is the "dishonest" manager type, where 
the players in the two settings possess the same payoff parameters.  The prior probability that the 
manager is dishonest is common knowledge and equal to the risk of fraud in period one.  
Furthermore, the game continues to period two only if fraud is not discovered at the end of 
period one.   
 In both settings, the auditor in period two updates the probability that the manager is 
dishonest, based on period one audit effort and the public knowledge that no fraud was 
discovered in period one.  The continuing auditor has direct knowledge of the audit testing 
performed in period one.  The "new" auditor in the change setting perfectly infers period one  
audit effort because of our simplifying assumption that the period one "old" auditor’s costs and 
the manager’s payoffs are common knowledge.1  
The key difference between the two settings is that the continuing auditor not only has 
information acquired in period one to use in the period two audit, but he chooses the amount of 
period one audit effort to control expected audit costs across both periods.  At the beginning of 
                                               
1  In practice, the new auditor may not be able to perfectly infer period one audit effort, because he has only limited 
information of the manager’s and old auditor’s payoffs in period one.  However, this simplifying assumption 
biases against our results and highlights the differences in equilibria between the two settings (also see footnote 5 
for additional details). 
  4 
period one, the continuing auditor plans how he will audit in each period in order to minimize his 
total expected costs, taking into consideration how he anticipates the manager will react to each 
period's effort choice.  In contrast, when there is a change in auditors, the old auditor has no  
incentive to consider the effect of his period one effort choice on period two outcomes and 
costs.2 
Overall, our results show that audit risk, which is the unconditional probability that fraud 
goes undetected in our model, is lower in both periods for the continuing auditor than with a 
change in auditors.  More importantly, our results also show that across both periods, expected 
undetected fraud is lower for the continuing auditor than with a change in auditors.   However, 
we also find that the continuing auditor chooses less audit effort in the later period, relative to the 
effort choice of the new auditor in the change setting.  This result derives from the continuing 
auditor choosing higher effort in period one than would be chosen with a change in auditors.  
While lower audit effort in the later period for the continuing auditor might suggest an 
impairment of independence, this is strictly the result of the players maximizing their expected 
payoffs and not due to the continuing auditor becoming "too cozy" with the client.  
This paper significantly adds to our knowledge of strategic auditing.  Most strategic 
auditing models primarily involve just one period and do not take into account how the auditor 
might strategically use information from previous audit periods in the current period.  Some 
models, such as Patterson and Smith (2007, 2016) and Smith, Tiras, Vichitlekarn (2000) do 
consider two-stage audits that allow the auditor to obtain information by testing internal controls 
in a first stage and then use that information for substantive testing in the second stage.3  Our 
                                               
2  He also has no ability to do so, because at the beginning of period one the old auditor only knows that his 
engagement with the firm ends and has no knowledge of who the new auditor would be. 
3  Other related studies include Newman, Patterson, and Smith (2001), Patterson and Smith (2003), Patterson and 
Noel (2003), and more recently, Laux and Newman (2008) and Patterson, Smith, and Tiras (2018). 
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two-period model differs from these two-stage models in that the effort in each period of our 
two-period model is designed to detect fraud.  Because we have two distinct periods, we can 
compare the two settings: a continuing auditor that audits both periods and a setting in which the 
audit in each period is performed by a different auditor. 
 Corona and Randhawa (2010) also examine a two-period strategic audit setting, in  
which the manager in each period chooses fraud or no fraud and the auditor chooses an audit  
report.  They demonstrate a circumstance in which an auditor that does not identify fraud in one 
period might not report fraud that is detected in a later period because it would highlight their 
failure in the previous period.  By construction, the auditor in their model does indeed lack 
independence.  But because their model does not provide any penalties or other disincentives for 
the auditor to hide the fraud, their model cannot address the potential benefit to multi-period  
auditing.   
Our model also relates to the audit-pricing model of Magee and Tseng (1990).  Magee 
and Tseng (1990) demonstrate that in a multi-period audit environment with learning and 
switching costs, auditors include these costs in their pricing strategies.  They show that even 
without commitment, competitive multi-period equilibria exist and that the equilibrium price 
incorporates the total expect cost of the audit. The auditor in Magee and Tseng (1990) adopts a 
"look ahead" strategy.  In our setting with a continuing auditor, we focus on the strategic 
interaction between the auditor and manager where both anticipate the auditor continuing for two 
periods. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section II, we lay out the two 
settings of our two-period model.  Section III provides an equilibrium analysis while Section IV 
provides a comparative analysis of both settings.  Section V compares expected undetected fraud 
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and audit risk across the two settings and Section VI discusses related empirical insights.  
Section VII concludes the paper. 
II.  A TWO-PERIOD MODEL OF AUDITING 
 We consider a two-period model of auditing that includes an auditor and a possibly 
dishonest manager in two settings.  The first setting depicts a situation where the "old" auditor of 
period one is replaced with a "new" auditor in period two.  In the second setting, one 
"continuing" auditor audits both periods and chooses audit effort in the first period to minimize 
his expected audit costs across both periods. 4   
 Public information is revealed at the end of period one in both settings.  At the end of 
period one the players know whether or not the auditor discovered fraud in period one.  If fraud 
is not detected, the game continues to period two; otherwise, it ends at the end of period one.  
The updated period two probability that the manager is dishonest depends upon the auditor’s 
effort in period one.  
 In both settings, the auditor(s) and manager have the same basic payoffs while the 
expected payoffs for the auditor in periods one and two depend on whether or not there has been 
a change in auditors.  The manager is dishonest with prior probability .   The dishonest 
manager chooses an amount of fraud equal to  and  in periods one and two, respectively.  
He receives net benefits of  and  if no fraud is detected by the auditor, and his penalty 
for fraud detection is  and .  The payoffs  and  represent the benefits of 
fraud less personal costs for committing fraud such as the manager's designs to circumvent the 
                                               
4  Our model is consistent with the audit-pricing model proposed by Magee and Tseng (1990).  They model the 
market for audit services as a dynamic program over N periods.  In each period, there are two types of learning 
costs: those that accrue to the auditor and those that accrue to the client.  These costs create a friction that results 
in an expectation of multi-period audits without any commitment to a multi-period contract. Moreover, the multi-
period pricing depends on the anticipated multi-period audit costs over the N periods. 
θ
a1 a2
a1R1 a2R2
− a1
2
2 p1 −
a22
2 p2 a1R1 a2R2
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audit strategy.  The rewards and penalties for periods one and two are independent across both 
periods. 
 The auditor in period one chooses audit effort equal to  and the auditor in period two 
chooses audit effort equal to .  Given the manager is dishonest, the auditor detects fraud in 
periods one and two with probabilities  and , respectively.  The auditor 
incurs a liability cost in each period for undetected fraud of  and , while  and  are  
cost multipliers for audit effort that yield a cost of audit effort in each period of  and . 
The Manager's Expected Payoff 
 We work backwards to derive the manager's expected payoff by starting with period two 
and then incorporating it into period one.  The form of the manager's expected payoff does not 
change between settings.   It remains the same whether or not a change in auditors occurs at the 
end of period one.  His fraud strategy can differ based upon which setting we analyze but the 
basic construct of his expected payoff remains the same. 
 The manager's period two expected payoff is as follows.
    (1) 
 is the dishonest manager’s expected payoff in period two, when a period one fraud goes 
undetected.  Note that the reward from period one  is retained in period two.  If fraud in 
period two is detected, we assume that the manager has already consumed the benefits of any 
undetected fraud committed in period one. We assume that the penalty for detected fraud in 
period two is independent of any undetected fraud in period one. 
The dishonest manager's expected payoff at the beginning of period one is as follows.
  (2)  
x1
x2
1− exp −x1( ) 1− exp −x2( )
a1L1 a2L2 k1 k2
x1k1 x2k2
 
M2 = a1R1 + a2R2 exp −x2( )− a2
2
2
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
 M2
a1R1
M1 = M 2 exp −x1( )− a1
2
2 p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
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 reflects the fact that the reward from fraud over the two periods occurs only if the period 1 
fraud goes undetected.  Thus, if the period one fraud goes undetected, which occurs with 
probability , the manager expects a payoff associated with .  On the other hand, if 
the auditor detects the period one fraud, the manager receives zero benefit from fraud and is  
penalized .  
 Next we consider the auditor's expected payoffs where its characterization depends on  
whether or not a change in auditors has occurred at the end of period one. 
The Auditor's Expected Payoff 
Setting 1: A Change in Auditors  
 Assume there is a change in auditors at the end of period one that everyone knows will 
occur at the start of the game. In this case, each auditor maximizes his own expected payoff, the 
new auditor for period two and the old auditor for period one.  Except for the undiscovered fraud 
in the first period, no public information from the first period is accrued by the new auditor in 
period two. However, the second period new auditor can infer the effort choice of the old auditor 
because we assume that the new auditor knows the payoff parameters of the manager and the old 
auditor.5  Thus, if no fraud is detected in the first period, the new auditor updates the probability 
that the manager is dishonest given the inferred choice of period one audit effort. 
 In order to compare the two settings, we assume that the expected liability costs resulting 
from undetected fraud in period one are independent from the expected liability costs resulting 
                                               
5  This assumption presents the most extreme case in modeling the continuing auditor relative to the change auditor 
 where there is no period one information advantage for the continuing auditor. Thus, we can provide  
 analytic clarity regarding the differences and potential advantages of a continuing auditor relative to a change in  
 auditors. However, one could argue that only imperfect information of the old auditor's period one payoffs exists.  
 Relative to perfect information, imperfect information reduces the expected value of period one effort and  
 increases the inferred updated probability of the dishonest type in period two. As a result, our overall findings, on  
  average, remain unchanged.  Details of the analysis involving imperfect information in the setting with a change  
 in auditors is available upon request. 
M1
exp −x1( ) M 2
 
a1
2
2
p1
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from undetected fraud in period two.  We assume that the likelihood that undetected fraud in 
period one is subsequently brought to light in the future is exogenously captured by the 
parameter . 
 Below we express the expected payoffs in periods one and two for the new and 
old  auditors. 
 New auditor – second period 
   (3) 
where  is the probability of the dishonest type manager, given 
no fraud was discovered in period one. 
 The expected payoff for the predecessor auditor follows. 
 Old auditor – first period 
   (4) 
The sequence of events for setting one is given in Figure 1. 
Setting 2: A Continuing Auditor 
 
 Next we assume that the same auditor audits both period one and period two.  We start at 
the end of the game in formulating the auditor's total expected payoff.  The continuing auditor 
incurs all the liability and effort costs for periods one and two. The auditor's second period 
payoff is 
    (5) 
where  is the updated probability of the dishonest type, given  
 L1
 A2new( )
 A1old( )
A2new = −Pr D | ND( )a2L2 exp −x2( )− x2k2
Pr D | ND( ) = θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
A1old = −θa1L1 exp −x1( )− x1k1
A2cont = −Pr D | ND( ) L1a1 + L2a2exp −x2( )( )− x2k2
Pr D | ND( ) = θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
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no fraud is detected in period one.6  The continuing auditor maintains his expected loss  for 
an undiscovered first period fraud whether or not fraud is discovered in the second period.  
Moreover, because the auditor audits both periods, he chooses  and  to minimize his costs 
across both periods.  He also uses the amount of period one audit effort to infer the likelihood 
that the manager is the dishonest type if no fraud is discovered in period one.  A key advantage 
of auditing both periods is the ability to choose  that provides the best benefits in choosing ,  
including an  that provides optimal updating of information for period two.   
 Then we have the auditor's first period expected payoff of  
   (6) 
where is the unconditional probability that no fraud is detected in period one, 
given the choice of audit effort .   
 In order to compare the two settings, we assume that the payoffs are the same across the 
two settings except that the auditor in the continuing setting is able to optimize his choices of  
and  across time because he audits both periods.  Consequently, the continuing auditor's 
expected payoff in (6) (the total expected payoff over the two periods) is equal to the expected 
payoffs of the old and new auditors in the change setting as long as  are the 
same.  To see that this is the case, we can add the expected payoff in (3) to the expected payoff 
in (4) multiplied by the probability that the game proceeds to the second period and we obtain 
expression (6).  The only differences between the two settings, then, derive from differences in 
the auditor and manager strategies. 
                                               
6 In this expression and all those that follow, ‘cont’ in the subscript is short for ‘continuing.’  
L1a1
 x1  x2
 x1  x2
 x1
A1cont = θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )( )A2cont − x1k1
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
 x1
 x1
 x2
 x1,  x2 ,  a1  and a2
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 The sequence of events for Setting 2 is given in Figure 2.  Our next section describes the 
equilibria for the two settings. 
III.  EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
Setting 1: A Change in Auditors 
 With a change in auditors, we use expressions (1) – (4) to solve for our equilibrium.  First 
note that the manager's expected payoff at the beginning of the game is 
  (7) 
which yields first order conditions 
   (8) 
and 
 .  (9) 
Conditions (8) and (9) yield the following fraud choices of  and , respectively. 
   and 
 
  (10) 
Expression (10) says that the manager selects the amount of fraud equal to the ratio of its 
expected marginal benefit to its expected marginal penalty. Thus, as audit effort increases the 
relative expected benefit of fraud decreases. 
 The auditor's first order conditions follow from expressions (3) and (4). 
    (11) 
   (12) 
M1 = a1R1 + a2R2 exp −x2( )− a2
2
2 p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
exp −x1( )− a1
2
2 p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
dM1
da1
= R1 exp −x1( )− a1p1 1− exp −x1( )( ) = 0
dM1
da2
= R2 exp −x2( )− a2p2 1− exp −x2( )( )( )exp −x1( ) = 0
a1 a2
a1 =
R1 exp −x1( )
p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
 
dA1old
dx1
= θa1L1 exp −x1( )− k1 = 0
dA2new
dx2
= Pr D | ND( )a2L2 exp −x2( )− k2 = 0
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Conditions (11) and (12) yield effort choices of  and , respectively.  
   and   (13) 
We use expressions (10) and (13) to obtain our equilibrium, which is stated in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Given a change in auditors, the unique equilibrium strategies for the 
manager, the old auditor and the new auditor are as follows. 
 
Manager: 
     and  
 
Auditorold  
  
 Auditornew 
 
(All proofs are in the Appendix) 
 
This provides a benchmark to compare the equilibrium with a continuing auditor. 
Setting 2: A Continuing Auditor 
 Next we derive the equilibrium when the auditor continues as the auditor of  
period two after auditing period one.  The characterization of the fraud amounts in expression 
(10) remains the same in this setting where   
x1 x2
x1 = Log
a1L1
k1
θ
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ x2 = Log
a2L2
k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
a1 =
R1
p1 −1+
1
2 1+ 1+
4L1R1
k1p1
θ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
a2 =
R2
p2 −1+
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
x1 = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4θR1L1
p1k1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
x2 = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4R2L2
p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
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   and 
 
 .   
 In this setting, we first solve for period two audit effort and then period one audit effort  
because information has been revealed between periods.7  When no fraud is detected in period 
one, the auditor uses his period one information to reassess the probability that the manager is 
dishonest and knowing this is the case chooses his effort in period one, accordingly, to minimize 
his total expected costs across both periods.  Based on his period two expected payoff in 
expression (5), the auditor's period two first order condition is equal to the following. 
    (14) 
     
Then we substitute for  into  and with some rearranging we obtain the following. 
,     (15) 
which we use to obtain the first order condition for . 
  
    (16) 
 
Next we substitute for into  and solve for . 
                                               
7  The equilibrium, given a continuing auditor, is technically defined implicitly based on four equilibrium 
conditions.  Due to the nature of our payoffs, a fully explicit solution is not possible.  However for convenience 
and to enable us to more intuitively compare the equilibrium to one with a change in auditors, we define each of 
the player's strategies as functions of the auditor's period one effort choice x1.  
a1 =
R1 exp −x1( )
p1 1− exp −x1( )( )  
a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
.
 
dA2cont
dx2
= Pr D | ND( ) L2a2exp −x2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )− k2 = 0⇒
 
x2 = Log
a2L2
k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
= Log
L2a2
k2
θ
θexp −x1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
− x1
x2  A1cont
 
A1cont =
−L1a1θ exp −x1( )
    − θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )( )k2 1− x1 + Log L2a2k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
− x1k1
x1
dA1cont
dx1
=
θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 + k2 1− x1 + Log L2a2k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ + 1−θ( )k2 − k1 = 0
a2 x2 x2
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 ,       (17) 
 which we need to obtain .  
   (18) 
The form of the equilibrium strategies for and  in the continuous case is the same as those 
for the new auditor, given a change in auditors.  However, the values are different due to the 
differing audit effort strategies in period one for the two settings.  
  Unlike the old auditor who has no ability and no incentive to control or minimize period 
two audit costs, the continuing auditor chooses his first period audit effort knowing that he will 
face a possibly dishonest manager in period two if no fraud is detected in period one.  Based on 
expression (16), we have the equilibrium condition for , labeled . 
        
  (19) 
where   is the same as expression (17) and  .  Expression (19) 
implicitly defines the equilibrium value of  because we cannot explicitly solve for .  
Furthermore, each of our equilibrium strategies are defined in terms of . 
Proposition 2: When the auditor continues from period one to period two the unique 
equilibrium strategies for the manager and auditor are as follows. 
 
Manager 
  and  
x2 = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
a2
a2 =
R2
p2 −1+
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
 a2  x2
x1 H x1[ ]
H x1[ ] = θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 x1[ ]+ k2 + k2x2 x1[ ]( ) + 1−θ( )k2 − k1 = 0
x2 x1[ ] a1 x1[ ] = R1 exp −x1( )p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
x1 x1
x1
a1 =
R1 exp −x1( )
p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
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Auditor 
   and 
 where   satisfies . 
 The equilibrium defined in Proposition 2 has several interesting characteristics.  First, we see that 
 and  are inversely related, all else held constant.   In Proposition 2,  decreases in  
without regard to a change in payoff parameters.  If no fraud is discovered in period one for a 
high  then the probability that the manager is the dishonest type is smaller and the auditor may 
find a reduction in  to be optimal.  Of course, the equilibrium relation between  and  
must be considered with regard to a change in a payoff parameter.  We explore this more 
thoroughly in the next section that provides a comparative analysis.
 
 Second, expression (19) that implicitly defines the equilibrium value of  shows that the 
first period audit effort  is greater than what would occur in period one when we have a 
change in auditors.  Note that expression (19) can be written as  
  (20) 
where  is the equilibrium condition for a single period game 
or alternatively, for the old auditor in period one.  As part of our proof to Proposition 2, we show 
that expression (19) decreases in  and expression (20) shows that point-wise it has larger 
values than that for a single period game.  Thus, the continuous auditor chooses greater period 
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one audit effort than the auditor who knows he is leaving at the end of period one, ceteris 
paribus.  As a result, the amount of fraud committed in the first year is less for a continuing 
auditor relative to an auditor who only audits period one. 
 Finding fraud sooner rather than later is more valuable to the continuing auditor, which 
translates into a smaller amount of period two effort relative to the new auditor. (See Corollary 
1).  Despite the new auditor's ability to update based on the inferred period one audit effort, the 
continuing auditor chooses lower audit effort in period two because period one audit effort is 
higher and he estimates a lower probability of fraud going into period two.  Due to the lower 
assessment of the probability of fraud for period two, one might infer that there has been a 
reduction in skepticism.  Furthermore, the loss of skepticism appears to be more for the 
continuing auditor versus the new auditor.  However, the lower probability assessment of fraud 
for the continuing auditor at the beginning of the second period is solely due to his choice of 
higher audit effort in the first period and the fact that fraud was not detected. 
 Third, we see that allowing the auditor to continue auditing in period two effectively 
reduces the marginal cost of his period one audit effort by an amount equal to .  As the 
prior probability that the manager is the honest type increases, the continuing auditor's first 
period marginal cost of audit effort decreases.  And, in the limit as , audit effort 
approaches "perfect auditing" in period one. 
 These results, which relate to comparisons within each period are formally presented in 
Corollary 1.  
 Corollary 1: For the continuing auditor relative to a change in auditors: 
1.  The amount of fraud is smaller and the amount audit effort is larger in period one. 
 
2.  The amount of fraud is larger and the amount of audit effort is smaller in period two. 
 
1−θ( )k2
k2→
k1
1−θ
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 Next we perform a comparative analysis on our equilibrium results, given various 
changes in payoff parameters. 
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANAYSIS OF CHANGES IN THE                                                
AUDITOR’S AND MANAGER’S PAYOFFS 
 
 In this section, we consider how the players' strategies change when the payoff  
parameters change.  For Setting 1 (the change setting), the auditor’s and manager’s period one  
strategies (  and , respectively) only depend upon the period one payoff parameters.  But, 
because the auditor can update the likelihood of the manager’s dishonesty based upon the first 
period outcome, the second period strategies for the auditor and manager depend upon period 
one parameters.  For Setting 2 (the continuing setting), all four strategies are jointly determined 
because the manager’s first period fraud choice is determined by the auditor’s first period effort 
choice, and the auditor’s first period effort choice is jointly determined with the auditor’s second 
period effort choice.  This is demonstrated by the equilibrium condition for  provided in 
expression (19). 
Proposition 3:  The following table summarizes the changes in equilibrium strategies for 
changes in the parameters, , , , and  where .  The comparative results 
are the same for both settings, except for the effect that period two parameters have on 
period one strategies (the shaded cells). 
 
 x1  a1
 x1
 Li  Ri  pi  ki  i∈ 1,2{ }
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 Effect on strategy 
Increase in 
period one 
payoff 
parameters 
x1 for continuing 
 and change settings 
a1 for continuing  
and change settings 
x2 for 
continuing 
and change 
settings 
a2 for 
continuing 
and change 
settings 
     
      
      
     
Increase in 
period two 
payoff 
parameters 
x1 for 
continuing 
setting 
x1 for 
change    
setting 
a1 for 
continuing 
setting 
a1 for 
change    
setting 
x2 for 
continuing 
and change 
settings 
a2 for 
continuing 
and change 
settings 
  0  0   
  0  0   
  0  0   
  0  0   
 
The above table is constructed as four quadrants.  The top-left quadrant describes the 
effects that changes in period one payoff parameters have on the period one auditor and manager 
strategies.  Similarly, the bottom-right quadrant describes how changes in period two payoff 
parameters affect period two auditor and manager strategies.  Note that these two quadrants are 
identical.  Changes in the payoff parameters within a given period induce the same intuitive 
changes in the auditor’s and manager’s strategies.  In a given period, an increase in the auditor’s 
litigation exposure  increases audit effort and the manager reacts by decreasing fraud whereas 
an increase in the auditor’s cost parameter for auditing  decreases audit effort and the manager 
reacts by increasing fraud.  Also, in a given period, an increase in the manager’s benefit 
parameter  increases fraud and the auditor reacts by increasing audit effort while an increase 
in the manager’s penalty parameter  decreases fraud and the auditor reacts by decreasing audit 
effort.  
 L1 + − − +
 R1 + + − +
 p1 − − + −
 k1 − + + −
 L2 + − + −
 R2 + − + +
 p2 − + − −
 k2 + − − +
 Li
 ki
 Ri
 pi
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Next consider the top-right quadrant of the table.  Every effect is the exact opposite of the 
effect in the top-left quadrant for audit effort  because an increase (decrease) in period one 
audit effort  decreases (increases) the updated probability of fraud in period two.  As a result, 
period two audit effort  decreases (increases).  For example, an increase in the period one 
liability cost  increases period one audit effort  (top-left quadrant), which in turn lowers the 
updated probability of fraud in period two and period two audit effort  decreases.  Moreover, 
because there is no change in a period two manager payoff parameter, the manager’s period two 
choice of fraud is only a reaction to the auditor’s period two choice of effort.  Thus, period two 
fraud increases (decreases) whenever period two audit effort decreases (increases), given a 
change in a period one payoff parameter. 
The bottom-left quadrant of the table illustrates the differential impact of the continuing 
auditor on auditing and fraud.  Only in the continuing auditor setting does the auditor know his 
period two payoffs and can adopt a "look-ahead" strategy where he can anticipate the effects of 
the period one strategies on his period two expected costs.  For example, if he expects liability 
costs in period two to increase, he increases his period one effort to help avoid a period two audit 
failure.  Increases in period two liability costs increase both period one and period two audit 
effort.  The continuing auditor optimally chooses effort in each of the two periods in order to 
minimize his overall costs of undetected fraud.  The old auditor in the change setting is incapable 
of this strategic choice.  As a result, the period two payoffs do not affect the period one strategies 
for the old auditor or the manager in the change setting.   
To see how ,   and , affect period one audit effort  for the continuing auditor, 
consider the equilibrium condition, , that determines . 
 
x2
x1
x2
L1 x1
x2
 L2  R2  p2 x1
H x1[ ] = 0 x1
H x1[ ] = θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 x1[ ]+ k2 + k2x2 x1[ ]( ) + 1−θ( )k2 − k1 = 0
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Because , we know that the sign of  depends only on the sign of 
 where g stands for a general payoff parameter.  Consequently,  
 because  where .  Moreover,  where 
,  and .  The results for  and  follow the same logic. 
For changes in ,  where , and 
 where   and .  Effectively, an increase in  reduces the 
marginal cost of period one audit effort.  
Figure 3 depicts a graphical example of audit effort and fraud in each of the two periods, 
for a change in auditors versus a continuing auditor and illustrates the results of Corollary 1.  
Audit effort is higher in period one and lower in period two while fraud is lower in period one 
and higher in period two for the continuing auditor relative to a change in auditors.  The figure 
also illustrates the results in Proposition 3 that relate to changes in period two's audit cost .  
Period two audit effort decreases in  and period two fraud increases in  for both settings.  
On the other hand, period one audit effort increases in  for the continuing auditor but it is 
unaffected by changes in  for the change auditor.  The continuing auditor, knowing that he 
goes on to audit period two, audits more aggressively in period one and therefore chooses a 
higher period one effort than the old auditor.  The dishonest manager responds to these audit 
dH x1[ ]
dx1
< 0 dx1
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−dH x1[ ] / dx1
dH x1[ ] / dg
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effort effects by decreasing period one fraud in the continuing auditor setting, but changes in  
have no effect on fraud in period one for the change setting. 
The next section shows that audit quality is always higher for the continuing auditor, 
where we measure audit quality as either expected undetected fraud or audit risk. 
V.  EXPECTED UNDETECTED FRAUD AND AUDIT RISK 
 We begin our analysis of audit quality by first comparing the two settings in terms of 
expected undetected fraud. 
Expected Undetected Fraud 
 Expected undetected fraud is measured as the probability that fraud occurs times the 
probability that fraud is not detected (given a fraud has occurred) times the amount of fraud.  As 
this measure decreases, audit quality increases. 
Setting 1: A Change in Auditors 
 For setting one where we have a change in auditors, expected undetected fraud over two 
periods is equal to 
  
.  (21) 
Setting 2: A Continuing Auditor 
 Expected undetected fraud in setting two is equal to 
 
   (22) 
 k2
θa1 exp −x1( ) + Pr D | ND( )a2 exp −x2( ) =
EUFchange =
k1
L1
+ k2L2
θa1 exp −x1( ) + Pr D | ND( )a2 exp −x2( ) =
EUFcont =
k1 − 1−θ( )k2
L1 +
k2
a1
1+ x2( )
+ k2L2
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We see that , which we formalize in Proposition 4, because clearly 
.  
 Proposition 4: Expected undetected fraud over the two periods, given a continuing 
 auditor is strictly less than that given a change in auditors. 
 
 The strategic aspects of a continuing auditor provide benefits that are not achieved by a 
change in auditors.  The continuing auditor chooses period one effort that anticipates the 
manager’s strategy over the two periods and thus has the ability to minimize his total expected 
costs.  Moreover, when a change in auditors is known to occur, the old auditor is only interested 
in how his strategic choice affects his own period one expected costs.   
 Figure 4 depicts a graphical example illustrating Proposition 4.  While the comparison is 
valid for all parameters, we demonstrate the relationship between  and  in terms 
of the auditor’s liability parameter in period two, .  Note that  for all values 
of  and a change in  affects  to a relatively greater extent. 
Audit Risk 
 In our setting, audit risk is the probability that the financial statements contain an   
undetected fraud.8  Furthermore, when we consider audit risk, we compare audit risk for each 
individual audit period across the two settings. 
Setting 1: A Change in Auditors 
 When there is a change in auditors, audit risk in period one is 
   
                                               
8 The professional standards define audit risk as the probability that the auditor issues an unqualified opinion given  
that the financial statements are materially misstated.  In our setting, the auditor issues an unqualified opinion if no 
fraud is detected. Thus audit risk is the probability fraud exists and goes undetected. 
EUFcont < EUFchange
k1 − 1−θ( )k2
L1 +
k2
a1
1+ x2( )
< k1L1
 EUFcont  
EUFchange
 L2 EUFcont < EUFchange
L2 L2 EUFcont
AR1old = θ exp −x1( )
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and in period two audit risk equals 
  
where  and  are from Proposition 1.   
Setting 2: A Continuing Auditor 
 When there is a continuing auditor, audit risk in period one is equal to  
  
and in period two audit risk is equal to 
  
where  and  are from Proposition 2. 
 Proposition 5: Audit risk in each period given a continuing auditor is strictly less  
 than that given a change in auditors. 
 
 Based on the equilibrium condition , we know that first period audit effort in 
Setting 2 is higher than that in Setting 1 and we have the following result, 
 ,  
which implies that audit risk is higher for the change auditor in period one.  Figure 5 provides a 
graphical representation of a comparison of period one audit risk across settings one and two as 
they relate to the auditor’s period one liability parameter .  Again any parameter could be 
used to illustrate these relationships.  Despite a higher audit effort in period two for a change in 
auditors, compared to a continuing auditor, audit risk remains lower in period two for the 
continuing auditor.   This occurs because period two audit risk in setting two includes the 
updated probability  that the manager is the fraudulent type where  is 
AR2new =
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
exp −x2( )
x1 x2
AR1cont = θ exp −x1( )
AR2cont =
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
exp −x2( )
x1 x2
H x1[ ]= 0
AR1old > AR1cont
 L1
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
x1
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greater for the continuing auditor.  Together our findings for expected undetected fraud and audit 
risk in each period show that audit quality is higher in the continuing setting compared to the 
change setting. 
VI.  EMPRICAL INSIGHTS 
Regulators, practitioners, and academic researchers continue to debate whether the 
efficiencies that result from an extended auditor tenure outweigh the potential impairment of 
auditor independence from the auditor becoming "too cozy" with the client.  As with other 
studies, we find audit quality is higher for the continuing auditor, in that both audit risk and 
expected undetected fraud are lower across the two periods for a continuing auditor compared to 
a change in auditors.  Our study demonstrates, that without empirical and experimental 
researchers developing an expectations model that reflects the extent audit quality would differ 
in the absence of an impairment of independence, the evidence to date is inconclusive on 
whether an impairment does or does not exist.   
The concern about impairment of independence continues to be fueled by the observed 
phenomenon in later periods that audit effort is smaller and the amount of fraud is larger for a 
continuing auditor compared to a new auditor.  A key finding of our study, however, is that the 
continuing auditor would typically exert more effort in the earlier period to discover fraud, which 
in turn results in less audit effort and more fraud in the later period.  This, of course, has the 
appearance that audit tenure impairs auditor independence. While an impairment of 
independence may indeed exist, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from observing lower audit 
effort and higher fraud in later periods of an auditor's tenure without first calibrating the expected 
differences between a continuing auditor and a change in auditor, again in the absence of an 
impairment of independence.   
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With the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new concerns arose about auditor tenure eroding 
auditor independence.  Rather than creating mandatory audit firm rotations to alleviate these 
concerns, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) enhanced the provision for mandatory partner 
rotation by reducing the rotation period to a maximum of five years.  In terms of our model, 
mandating partner rotation potentially increases the cost of auditing in the later periods for a new 
continuing auditor firm partner, represented by k2.   
The desired effects of SOX reducing the rotation period was to increase audit quality by 
reducing the possibility that audit partner tenure impairs auditor independence.  Gipper, Hail, and 
Leuz (2017) analyze a large scale sample of partner rotations in the U.S. to test for this 
possibility, but find no evidence that audit quality increased with the SOX requirement.  The 
results from our study provide an explanation as to why the above study did not find an 
improvement in their indicators of audit quality.  Our comparative statics indicate that as k2 
increases, audit effort by the continuing auditor (in this case, a continuing audit firm with a 
different lead audit partner) decreases even more in the later audit period relative to the new 
auditor.  The amount of fraud in the later period also increases as k2 increases.  
While mandatory audit partner rotation might be effective in reducing the possible 
impairment of independence from auditor tenure, the untended consequences of mandatory audit 
partner rotation are potentially opposite of SOX’s goal to increase audit quality.  By applying the 
results of our comparative statics to future experimental and empirical studies, future tests will 
be able to identify whether the positive effects of mandatory audit partner rotation on auditor 
independence outweigh the unintended negative effects of mandatory audit partner rotation from 
increasing period two audit costs . 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 k2
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 We consider a game-theoretic model of auditing where a manager possibly commits 
fraud over two periods and an auditor attempts to detect the fraud, if it exists.  We compare two 
settings of this model.  In the first, a different auditor audits each period. The auditor in the 
second period can update the probability that the manager is dishonest based on his inference of 
the old auditor's actions.  However, the incentives of the auditors in each period are independent.  
In the second setting a single auditor audits both periods.  In this case, the continuing auditor can 
efficiently choose audit effort in each of the two periods to minimize the combined costs of 
auditing and litigation exposure across the two periods.  As a result, a continuing auditor chooses 
a higher amount of period one audit effort and the manager chooses a lesser amount of period 
one fraud.  If there is no fraud detected at the end of period one, the continuing auditor chooses a 
lower amount of period two audit effort relative to a new period two auditor, because the period 
one evidence for the continuing auditor indicates that there is a lower risk of a dishonest-type 
manager.  
 Our results also show that two measures of audit quality are always higher for a 
continuing auditor.  This occurs despite a lower level of period two audit effort for the 
continuing auditor when compared to the period two audit effort given a change in auditors.  We 
find that audit risk (the probability fraud exists and goes undetected) is lower in each period for 
the continuing auditor.  More importantly, total expected undetected fraud across the two periods 
is lower for the continuing auditor.     
 In addition, we show how the period one and period two strategies for the auditor and 
manager change for changes in various payoff parameters.  The cross-period effects related to 
changes in period one payoffs and the within-period effects for any payoff change are the same 
for both settings.  For example, a period one payoff change, in either setting, that induces an 
increase in period one audit effort also causes both a decrease in audit effort and an increase in 
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fraud in period two.  However, changes in period two payoffs only affect the manager’s and 
auditor’s period one strategies in the continuing auditor setting.  For example, if period two 
liability costs increase, the continuing auditor chooses higher audit effort in period one as added 
assurance of avoiding a more costly period two audit failure. 
Finally, our results provide guidance for future research.  The concern expressed by 
regulators and others is that longer auditor tenures could result in an impairment of 
independence.  Most empirical studies conclude that longer auditor tenure improves audit 
quality. However, these studies cannot address whether longer auditor tenure impairs 
independence without first calibrating the extent that audit quality would be expected to be 
higher with a continuing auditor, had there not been any impairment of independence.  The 
equilibrium findings of our model provide the theoretical guidance necessary for developing 
these expectations.  Specifically, we show that observing lower audit effort and higher amounts 
of fraud in the later audit periods is not necessarily associated with impairment of independence 
as many regulators and others may conclude.  Rather this observation is a direct result of the 
efficient choices of audit effort in each of the two periods by a continuing auditor.  Our study 
provides the necessary theoretical guidance for experimental and empirical researchers to 
disentangle whether such observations are evidence of an impairment, or simply evidence of the 
continuing auditor optimizing his effort choice in each period. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
From expressions (10) and (13) we have 
 
 
and  . 
Thus,  , which is a quadratic equation. 
The solution to a general quadratic of  . 
Therefore, .    
Substituting into  we get  . 
Substituting  back into  we have . 
We also have  and  where  
 and  are solved for in a similar fashion and  is replaced with the updated probability of 
. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
First, we derive the auditor’s first period expected payoff, given fixed  and . 
Recall that  must satisfy  (expression (14) in the 
paper).  This results in  
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.   
We also have 
  where . 
Then substitute for  with  fixed and we obtain the following for .  
.
 
Substitute back into . 
where  is the probability that no fraud is detected in period one.
 
Then,  
       . 
The above is expression (15) in the paper. 
Next take the first derivative of  with respect to . 
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 Thus, we have,
 
.     (A1) 
 
Take the second derivative and we get
 
 
where note that .      
Thus,  is concave in .  
Expression (A1) is our basis for implicitly defining . We substitute for  and  where ,  
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⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ / dx1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ − k1
       = L1a1θ exp −x1( )+θ exp −x1( )k2 1− x1 + Log L2a2k2
θ
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
                  − θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )( )k2 −1+ θ exp −x1( )θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− k1.
dA1cont
dx1
= θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 + k2 1− x1 + Log L2a2k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ + 1−θ( )k2 − k1
d 2A1cont
dx12
= −θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 + k2 1− x1 + Log L2a2k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
                                                      −θ exp −x1( )k2 1−
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
< 0
x2 = −x1 + Log
L2a2
k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ > 0
A1cont x1
x1 a1 a2 a1
a2 x2 x1 a2 =
R2exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
a2
x2 = Log
L2a2
k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ − x1 x2
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   and 
. 
In applying the quadratic formula , we get 
 and thus
. 
Next substitute for  in . We start with . 
Then we have . 
Next we rewrite expression (A1) in terms of  that defines the equilibrium condition for . 
  (A2) 
where    and  . 
x2 = Log
L2
R2exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
k2
θ
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
− x1 ⇒
exp x2( ) = L2R2p2k2 exp x2( )−1( )
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
exp x2( )( )2 − exp x2( )− L2R2p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
= 0
for ay2 + by + c = 0,   y = −b ± b
2 − 4ac
2a
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
exp x2( ) = 12 1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
x2 = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
x2 a2 a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( ) =
R2
p2 exp x2( )−1( )
a2 =
R2
p2 −1+
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
> 0
x1 x1
H x1[ ] = θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 x1[ ]+ k2 + k2x2 x1[ ]( ) + 1−θ( )k2 − k1 = 0
a1 x1[ ] = R1 exp −x1( )p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
x2 x1[ ] = Log 12 1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
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Finally we know that expression (A2) yields a unique  and hence unique values of ,  and 
, which we show below that based on our assumption of ,  
  (A3) 
and after substituting in condition (A2), we have 
  (A4) 
where  and 
 
 .   (A5) 
As a result, to determine the sign of how  changes with respect to a parameter  
we need to calculate 
   where g stands for a parameter (e.g. ).  We know that  so that 
the sign of  is the same as the sign of  where  is fixed. 
Proof of Corollary 1:  
First note that the characterization of fraud in both settings is from expression (10) where  
x1 a1 a2
x2 k1 − 1−θ( )k2( ) > 0
dH x1[ ]
dx1
< 0.
dH x1[ ]
dx1
= −θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 x1[ ]+ k2 + k2x2 x1[ ]( ) +θ exp −x1( ) L1 da1 x1[ ]dx1 + k2
dx2 x1[ ]
dx1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
dH x1[ ]
dx1
= − k1 − 1−θ( )k2( ) +θ exp −x1( ) L1 da1 x1[ ]dx1
+ k2
dx2 x1[ ]
dx1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
< 0
da1 x1[ ]
dx1
= − R1p1
exp x1( )
exp x1( )−1( )2
< 0
dx2
dx1
= −
2exp x1( ) 1−θ( )θL2R2
k2p2 exp x1( ) 1−θ( ) +θ( )2 1+ 4L2R2p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
•
                    1+ 1+ 4L2R2p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
< 0
x1
dx1
dg =
dH x1[ ]
dg
−
dH x1[ ]
dx1
L1 −
dH x1[ ]
dx1
> 0
dx1
dg
dH x1[ ]
dg x1
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 and  .       
Furthermore, 
 
and .   (A6) 
We know from Proposition 1 that for the "old" and "new" auditors of periods one and two  
and  
where  is the amount of period one effort inferred by the new auditor and based on our 
assumption about knowledge of payoffs, .  Furthermore, Proposition 2 shows that 
is smaller compared to audit effort in period one for the continuing auditor, and thus, we know 
from (A6) that the amount of period one fraud is greater for the change auditor. 
 Proposition 2 shows that for the continuing versus the change auditor in period two
 
   
 
because  decreases in .   Thus, the amount of fraud in period two is more 
for a continuing auditor than for the new auditor and the amount of audit effort is less . 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We prove the results for each quadrant as detailed below.    
(1) The top-left quadrant of the table 
(1a)  increases in  and , while decreasing in  and . 
a1 =
R1 exp −x1( )
p1 1− exp −x1( )( )
a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
da1
dx1
= − R1p1
exp x1( )
exp x1( )−1( )2
< 0 da2dx2
= − R1p1
exp x2( )
exp x2( )−1( )2
< 0
x1old = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4θL1R1
k1p1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 
x2
new = Log 1
2
1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1
new( )
θ exp −x1
new( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
 x1
new
 x1
new = x1
old x1old
x2cont = Log
1
2 1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x
1
cont( )
θ exp −x
1
cont( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
<
 
Log 1
2
1+ 1+
4L2R2
p2k2
θ exp −x1
new( )
θ exp −x1
new( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
= x2
new
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )  
x1
x1 L1 R1 p1 k1
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Setting 1– the old auditor 
 increases in . 
.   
 increases in . 
. 
 decreases in . 
. 
decreases in . 
. 
Setting 2 -- the continuing auditor 
Recall (A2) or . 
As discussed in the proof to Proposition 2,    where g stands for a general 
parameter (e.g. ) . We know that  so that the sign of  is the same as the  
sign of  where  is fixed.  
 
 increases in . 
 
. 
x1 L1
dx1
dL1
= 2R1θ
k1p1 + 4L1R1θ + k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
> 0
x1 R1
dx1
dR1
= 2L1θ
k1p1 + 4L1R1θ + k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
> 0
x1 p1
dx1
dp1
= − 2R1L1θ
p1 k1p1 + 4L1R1θ + k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1( ) < 0
x1 k1
dx1
dk1
= − 2R1L1θ
k1 k1p1 + 4L1R1θ + k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1( ) < 0
H x1[ ] = θ exp −x1( ) L1a1 x1[ ]+ k2 + k2x2 x1[ ]( ) + 1−θ( )k2 − k1
dx1
dg =
dH x1[ ]
dg
−
dH x1[ ]
dx1
L1 −
dH x1[ ]
dx1
> 0 dx1dg
dH x1[ ]
dg !x1
x1 L1
dH x1[ ]
dL1
= θ exp −x1( )a1 x1[ ] > 0
  35 
 increases in . 
.  
 decreases in . 
. 
 decreases in . 
 
(1b)  increases in  and , while decreasing in and . 
Setting 1 -- the old auditor 
 increases in . 
. 
 increases in . 
 . 
  decreases in . 
 . 
  decreases in . 
. 
Setting 2 -- the continuing auditor 
x1 R1
dH x1[ ]
dR1
= θ exp −x1( )L1 1p1 exp x1( )−1( )
> 0
x1 p1
dH x1[ ]
dp1
= −θ exp −x1( )L1 R1p12 exp x1( )−1( )
< 0
x1 k1
dH x1[ ]
dk1
= −1< 0
a1 R1 k1 L1 p1
a1 R1
da1
dR1
= k1
k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
> 0
a1 k1
da1
dk1
= 12L1θ
1+ p1k1 + 2L1R1θ
k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ > 0
a1 L1
da1
dL1
= − k12L12θ
1+ p1k1 + 2L1R1θ
k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ < 0
a1 p1
da1
dp1
= − k1R1
p1 k12p12 + 4L1R1θk1p1
< 0
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Recall from (A4) that  . 
 increases in . 
  
      . 
where . 
 increases in . 
 where  , and . 
 decreases in . 
Similarly,  where  . 
 decreases in . 
. 
 
(2) The bottom-right quadrant of the table 
(2a)  increases in  and , while decreasing in  and . 
Setting 1 -- the new auditor   
This proof is essentially the same as in part (1) above where  is replaced by  
dH x1[ ]
dx1
= − k1 − 1−θ( )k2( ) +θ exp −x1( ) L1 da1 x1[ ]dx1
+ k2
dx2 x1[ ]
dx1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
a1 R1
da1
dR1
= ∂a1
∂R1
+ ∂a1
∂x1
θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂R1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ∂a1
∂R1
1−
−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
> 0
∂a1
∂R1
> 0
a1 k1
da1
dk1
= ∂a1
∂k1
+ ∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dk1
> 0 ∂a1
∂k1
= 0 ∂a1
∂x1
< 0 dx1dk1
< 0
a1 L1
 
da1
dL1
=
∂a1
∂L1
+
∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dL1
< 0
 
∂a1
∂L1
= 0,
∂a1
∂x1
< 0,  and 
dx1
dL1
> 0
a1 p1
da1
dp1
= ∂a1
∂p1
1−
−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
< 0
 x2  L2  R2 p2  k2
θ
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.  Note that  in Setting I does not depend on any period 2 payoff 
parameters. 
Setting 2 – the continuing auditor
 
For the continuing auditor we have the following. 
Recall from (A5) that 
 where
. 
And we use the expression 
  from (A4) . 
 
 increases in . 
  
  
 
 
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )  
x1
∂x2
∂x1
= −
2exp x1( )L2R2 1−θ( )θ
k2p2 exp x1( ) 1−θ( ) +θ( )2 SQ2 1+ SQ2( )
< 0
SQ2 = 1+
4L2R2
k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
>1
dH x1[ ]
dx1
= − k1 − 1−θ( )k2( ) +θ exp −x1( ) L1 da1 x1[ ]dx1
+ k2
dx2 x1[ ]
dx1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
x2 L2
 
dx2
dL2
=
∂x2
∂L2
+
∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dL2
 
=
∂x2
∂L2
+
∂x2
∂x1
dH x1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
dL2
−dH x1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
dx1
=
∂x2
∂L2
+
∂x2
∂x1
θ exp −x1( )k2 ∂x2∂L2
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 da1dx1 + k2
dx2
dx1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ∂x2
∂L2
1−
−θ exp −x1( )k2 ∂x2∂x1
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
> 0
  38 
where the second term inside the parentheses is less than one, resulting in a positive sum within 
the parentheses and . 
increases in .  
 
 and similar to the derivation above  
        
  where . 
 
decreases in . 
Similarly,   where . 
decreases in . 
 
       
 
∂x2
∂L2
=
2exp x1
−1( )R2θ
k2 p2 1−θ( ) + exp x1−1( )θ( )SQ2 1+ SQ2( ) > 0
x2 R2
dx2
dR2
= ∂x2
∂R2
+ ∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dR2
= ∂x2
∂R2
+ ∂x2
∂x1
θ exp −x1( )k2 ∂x2∂R2
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ∂x2
∂R2
1−
−θ exp −x1( )k2 ∂x2∂x1
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
> 0 ∂x2
∂R2
> 0
x2 p2
dx2
dp2
= ∂x2
∂p2
1−
−θ exp −x1( )k2 ∂x2∂x1
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
< 0 ∂x2
∂p2
< 0
x2 k2
dx2
dk2
= ∂x2
∂k2
+ ∂x2
∂x1
1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( ) k2 ∂x2∂k2
+1+ x2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ∂x2
∂k2
+ ∂x2
∂x1
θ exp −x1( ) k2 ∂x2∂k2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
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where .  
(2b)   increases in , and , while decreasing in and . 
For Setting I, the proof is essentially the same as that for period one in (1b) above. 
Setting 2 – the continuing auditor 
Recall that one way to write  is . 
 increases in . 
   because 
as shown above and 
 where  and  .  Finally,  .  
 increases in . 
For this proof we use the form of  . 
+ ∂x2
∂x1
1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( ) 1+ x2( )
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ∂x2
∂k2
1−
−θ exp −x1( ) k2 ∂x2∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
+ ∂x2
∂x1
1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( ) 1+ x2( )
k1 − 1−θ( )k2( )−θ exp −x1( ) L1 ∂a1∂x1
+ k2
∂x2
∂x1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
< 0
∂x2
∂k2
= −
2exp −x1( )L2R2θ
k22p2 1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( )( )SQ2 1+ SQ2( )
< 0
a2 R2 k2 L2 p2
a2 a2 =
R2 exp −x2 x1[ ]( )
p2 1− exp −x2 x1[ ]( )( )
a2 R2
da2
dR2
= ∂a2
∂R2
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dR2
> 0
 
dx1
dR2
> 0
∂a2
∂x1
= ∂a2
∂x2
∂x2
∂x1
> 0 ∂a2
∂x2
< 0 ∂x2
∂x1
< 0 ∂a2
∂R2
> 0
a2 k2
a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
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We have   
where ,  and , which is shown to be true above. 
 decreases in . 
For this proof we use the form of  . 
  where ,  and , 
which is shown to be true above. 
 decreases in . 
,which is proved similarly to   above.  
 
(3) The top-right quadrant of the table 
 
The proofs that follow apply to both Setting 1 and Setting 2. 
 
(3a)  decreases in  and  increases  in . 
 
 decreases in .  
  where . 
 increases  in . 
  where 
 
(3b)  decreases in , while  increases  in . 
 decreases in . 
  where  (from part(1)). 
 increases  in . 
da2
dk2
= ∂a2
∂k2
+ ∂a2
∂x2
dx2
dk2
> 0
∂a2
∂k2
= 0 ∂a2
∂x2
< 0 dx2dk2
< 0
a2 L2
a2 =
R2 exp −x2( )
p2 1− exp −x2( )( )
da2
dL2
= ∂a2
∂L2
+ ∂a2
∂x2
dx2
dL2
< 0 ∂a2
∂L2
= 0 ∂a2
∂x2
< 0 dx2dL2
> 0
a2 p2
da2
dp2
= ∂a2
∂p2
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dp2
< 0 da2dR2
x2 L1 a2 L1
x2 L1
dx2
dL1
= ∂x2
∂L1
+ ∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dL1
< 0 ∂x2
∂L1
= 0,  ∂x2
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dL1
> 0
a2 L1
da2
dL1
= ∂a2
∂L1
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dL1
> 0 ∂a2
∂L1
= 0,  ∂a2
∂x1
= ∂a2
∂x2
∂x2
∂x1
> 0 and dx1dL1
> 0
x2 R1 a2 R1
x2 R1
dx2
dR1
= ∂x2
∂R1
+ ∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dR1
< 0 ∂x2
∂R1
= 0,  ∂x2
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dR1
> 0
a2 R1
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  where  
(3c)  increases in  while  decreases in . 
 increases in .  
  where . 
 
 decreases in . 
  where . 
 (3d)  increases in  and  decreases in .  
 increases in .  
  where 
 
 decreases in .  
  where  
 
(4) The bottom-left quadrant of the table  
 
This proof only applies to Setting 2 because the strategies in Setting 1 do not depend on any of  
the period two payoff parameters. 
 
 increases in . 
 because  . 
 decreases  in . 
  where . 
 increases in . 
da2
dR1
= ∂a2
∂R1
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dR1
> 0 ∂a2
∂R1
= 0,  ∂a2
∂x1
= ∂a2
∂x2
∂x2
∂x1
> 0 and dx1dR1
> 0
x2 p1 a2 p1
x2 p1
dx2
dp1
= ∂x2
∂p1
+ ∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dp1
> 0 ∂x2
∂p1
= 0,  ∂x2
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dp1
< 0
a2 p1
da2
dp1
= ∂a2
∂p1
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dp1
< 0 ∂a2
∂p1
= 0,  ∂a2
∂x1
= ∂a2
∂x2
∂x2
∂x1
> 0 and dx1dp1
< 0
x2 k1 a2 k1
x2 k1
dx2
dk1
= ∂x2
∂k1
+ ∂x2
∂x1
dx1
dk1
> 0 ∂x2
∂k1
= 0,  ∂x2
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dk1
< 0
a2 k1
da2
dk1
= ∂a2
∂k1
+ ∂a2
∂x1
dx1
dk1
< 0 ∂a2
∂k1
= 0,  ∂a2
∂x1
> 0 and dx1dk1
< 0
x1 L2
dx1
dL2
> 0
dH x1[ ]
dL2
= θ exp −x1[ ]k2 ∂x2∂L2
> 0
a1 L2
da1
dL2
= ∂a1
∂L2
+ ∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dL2
< 0 ∂a1
∂L2
= 0,  ∂a1
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dL2
> 0
x1 R2
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 because . 
 decreases  in . 
  where . 
 decreases in . 
 because . 
 increases in . 
  where . 
 increases in . 
 because   
 
where and  
 
  . 
 decreases in . 
  where . 
dx1
dR2
> 0 dH x1[ ]dR2
= θ exp −x1[ ]k2 ∂x2∂R2
> 0
a1 R2
da1
dR2
= ∂a1
∂R2
+ ∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dR2
< 0 ∂a1
∂R2
= 0,  ∂a1
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dR2
> 0
x1 p2
dx1
dp2
< 0
dH x1[ ]
dp2
= θ exp −x1[ ]k2 ∂x2∂p2
< 0
a1 p2
da1
dp2
= ∂a1
∂p2
+ ∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dp2
> 0 ∂a1
∂p2
= 0,  ∂a1
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dp2
< 0
x1 k2
dx1
dk2
> 0 dH x1[ ]dk2
= θ exp −x1( ) k2 ∂x2∂k2
+1+ x2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ 1−θ( )
= 1−θ +θ exp −x1( ) −
2exp −x1( )L2R2θ
k2p2 1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( )( )SQ2 1+ SQ2( )
+1+ x2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ > 0
SQ2 = 1+
4L2R2
k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
>1
2exp −x1( )L2R2θ
k2p2 1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( )( )SQ2 1+ SQ2( )
   = 2exp −x1( )L2R2θ
k2p2 1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( )( ) SQ2 +1+ 4L2R2k2p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( ) + 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 = 2exp −x1( )L2R2θ
k2p2 1−θ( ) +θ exp −x1( )( ) SQ2 +1( ) + 4θ exp −x1( )L2R2( ) <1
a1 k2
da1
dk2
= ∂a1
∂k2
+ ∂a1
∂x1
dx1
dk2
< 0 ∂a1
∂k2
= 0,  ∂a1
∂x1
< 0 and dx1dk2
> 0
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Proof of Proposition 4:   
Expected undetected fraud, given a continuing auditor, is strictly less than that given a change in 
auditors. When there is a change in auditors , expected undetected fraud for period one is 
   
.  Other undetected fraud amounts are 
derived in a similar fashion. 
 and  < .  Thus, . 
Proof of Proposition 5:  
Audit risk in period one for both settings is , and as we have shown in Proposition 2, 
audit effort for the continuing auditor is higher in period one.  Thus, audit risk is lower for the 
continuing auditor. 
 
Audit risk in period two for the "new" auditor is equal to 
and audit risk for the continuing auditor in period two is
  .     
Because     and  ,  > . 
θ exp −x1( )a1 = θ exp −Log 12 1+ 1+
4θR1L1
p1k1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
k1
2θL1
1+ 1+ 4θR1L1p1k1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= θ 1
1
2 1+ 1+
4θR1L1
p1k1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
k1
2θL1
1+ 1+ 4θR1L1p1k1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= k1L1
EUFchange =
k1
L1
+ k2L2
 
EUFcont =
k1 − 1−θ( )k2
L1 +
k2
a1
1+ x2( )
+
k2
L2
k1
L1
+ k2L2
EUFcont < EUFchange
θ exp −x1( )
AR2  new =
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
exp −x2( ) =
exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
2θ
1+ 1+ 4R2L2p2k2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
,
AR2  cont =
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
exp −x2( ) =
exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
2θ
1+ 1+
4L2R2
k2 p2
θ exp −x1( )
θ exp −x1( )+ 1−θ( )
dAR2 cont
dx1
< 0  x1
old < x1
cont
 AR2 new AR2  cont
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FIGURE 1 
Timeline for a change in auditors 
 
 
 Period one Period two 
 
 
Dishonest manager 
chooses the 
amount of fraud a1. 
 If fraud is detected 
the game ends; 
otherwise we go on 
to period two.  
 A new auditor is 
hired who infers 
effort x1. 
 Audit risk is 
measured, given no 
detection 
The old auditor 
chooses audit 
effort  x1, 
optimizing only 
over period one. 
 Audit risk is 
measured, given no 
detection. 
 Dishonest manager	
chooses fraud a2, 
knowing that the 
new auditor infers  
period one effort but 
only optimizes over 
period two. 
 
The new auditor 
updates the 
probability of the 
dishonest manager 
and chooses effort x2. 
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FIGURE 2 
Timeline for the continuing auditor 
 
 
 
 Period one Period two 
 
 
Dishonest manager 
chooses the 
amount of fraud a1, 
knowing the 
auditor optimizes 
over both periods. 
 
 If fraud is detected 
the game ends; 
otherwise we go on 
to period two.  
 The auditor continues 
in period two. 
 Audit risk is 
measured, given no 
detection. 
The continuing 
auditor chooses 
audit effort x1, 
knowing he uses x1 
to update and plans 
his choice of effort 
x2
 
 to optimize his 
expected payoffs 
over both periods.
  
 
 Audit risk is 
measured, given no 
detection 
 Dishonest manager	
chooses fraud a2, 
knowing that the 
continuing auditor has 
planned for effort x2, 
taking into 
account his x1 choice. 
 
The continuing auditor 
updates the probability 
of the dishonest 
manager and chooses 
effort x2. 
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FIGURE 3 
Audit Effort and the Amount of Fraud in Each of the Two Periods 
(Note that in calculating audit effort and fraud in the example below, k1 = 2) 
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Panel A: Audit Effort in Each of the Two Periods 
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Panel B: The Amount of fraud in Each of the Two Periods 
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FIGURE 4 
Expected Undetected Fraud for a Change in Auditors  
Versus a Continuing Auditor 
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FIGURE 5 
A Comparison of Audit Risk in Periods One and Two 
for a Change in Auditors Versus a Continuing Auditor 
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